

Traditional-Religious Leaders in Addressing Insecurity of Cattle Rustling and Armed Banditry in Katsina State, Nigeria

Abdullahi Mu'awiyya¹, Kamarulzaman Askandar^{2*}

¹Political Science Section, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), 11800 Pulau Pinang, Malaysia;

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Federal University Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria.

Email: muawiyya@student.usm.my; abdullahi.muawiyya@fulokoja.edu.ng

²Political Science Section, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), 11800 Pulau Pinang, Malaysia.

Email: zam@usm.my

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR (*):

Kamarulzaman Askandar
(zam@usm.my)

KEYWORDS:

Traditional-Religious Leaders
Insecurity
Cattle Rustling
Armed Banditry Katsina State

CITATION:

Abdullahi, M., & Kamarulzaman, A. (2025).
Traditional-Religious Leaders in Addressing
Insecurity of Cattle Rustling and Armed
Banditry in Katsina State, Nigeria. *Malaysian
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities
(MJSSH)*, 10(12), e003730.
<https://doi.org/10.47405/mjssh.v10i12.3730>

ABSTRACT

This study examines the role of traditional and religious leaders in addressing the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state, Nigeria. The study is anchored within Lederach's (1997) peacebuilding model. A mixed methods were used, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. The data was collected using 384 questionnaires comprised both open and closed-ended questions and administered appropriately in the eight (8) affected local government areas purposely selected to study. A semi-structured questionnaire was also designed, and conducted interviews with twenty (20) traditional and religious leaders randomly selected from study areas. The study adopted content and descriptive methods of data analysis using statistical tools like tables, graphs, and percentages. The study established that seventy-seven percent (77%) of the respondents acknowledged the efforts of traditional leaders, including dialogue and reconciliation attempts, formation of peace committees, creation of vigilante groups for self-defence, advising the government, and supporting security personnel with information, etc. Fifteen percent (15%) of the respondents disagreed, and eight percent (8%) were neutral. At the same time, religious leaders engaged in constant prayers, preachings, sensitization, reorientation, and attitude transformation, among others, as identified by eighty-five percent (85%) of the respondents. Seven percent (7%) disagreed, while eight percent (8%) were neutral. However, the study concluded that the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry are beyond the traditional and religious leaders' capabilities. Their efforts alone could not resolve the insecurity problems. It must be the collective responsibility of all stakeholders to achieve a permanent resolution and sustainable peace in Katsina state.

This study contributes to the existing literature on insecurity, cattle rustling and armed banditry. It is the first research that study the whole eight (8) affected local government areas, focusing on the roles and challenges of traditional-religious leaders in addressing the problems of insecurity within the state.

1. Introduction

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and religious nation. It is home to 374 distinct ethnic groups, each with its own cultural and traditional heritage spread across three dominant religious practices: Islam, Christianity, and Traditionalism (Bashiru & Hassan, 2011). Thus, tradition and religion influence most of the socio-economic and political life of people in the communities. Before the advent of formal government structures in Nigeria, people relied on traditional and religious institutions for almost everything, including dispute or conflict settlements. Aidelokhai (2022) argued that traditional leaders were the cultural, social, economic, and political administrators of their respective domains at that time. For example, Northern Nigeria has had a well-established, centralized, traditional authority system throughout the Hausa lands for centuries. The Jihad of Sheikh Usman Bin Fodio (1804-1808) in the Hausa lands and beyond further established an Islamic traditional authority system which revived the teachings and practices of Islam (Hallouch, 2018; Nmah & Amanambu, 2017). This established the basis for strong and harmonious working relationships between traditional rulers as symbols of culture or traditions and the spiritual leaders as guardians of religion across the communities.

As a result, even after the British colonialists founded the Northern protectorate in 1900, traditional and religious institutions and practices remained intact. Instead, Sir. Frederick Lugard, the first Governor-General of Nigeria (1914-1919), adopted their socio-economic and political structures to impose the indirect rule system in the region. After independence, the same structures serve as the institutional framework for modern local government administration in Nigeria (Munir & Odeh, 2014). Notwithstanding, the 1979, 1989, and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, designated the traditional leaders as ceremonial figureheads and turned them into advisory bodies to the democratically elected state governors and local government chairmen. However, they are to assist in maintaining peace and security by reporting any insecurity challenges within their communities to the state security authorities (Aidelokhai, 2022). Despite this, people still respect traditional institutions, particularly because the dividends of democratic governance have not yet reached the bulk of the population in the communities (Olawoyin, 2023). Alongside the traditional rulers, religious leaders have often taken the lead in settling disputes and mediating between many conflicting parties because of the respect communities accord them.

Given their centrality in dispute resolution, most studies on cattle rustling and armed banditry conducted by scholars (Adi & Onyebuchi, 2020; Ladan, 2015; Ladan & Usman, 2020; Ladan, 2019; Maigari et al., 2021; Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016; Oluyemi-Kusa & Salihu, 2016; Rosenje & Adeniyi, 2021; Sambo & Sule, 2021; Usman & Ahmed, 2021; Yahaya & Bello, 2020) concentrated on the roles of the state and federal governments in combating the insecurity challenges. Only a few studies were done to document some of the efforts of traditional and religious leaders in that aspect (Abubakar & Ibrahim, 2020; Kolade & Mohammed, 2022; Maigari et al., 2021; Manyok, 2017; Ojo et al., 2023).

1.1. Research Objective

Therefore, the overall objective of this study is to examine the roles and challenges faced by the traditional and religious leaders in transforming the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state.

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Review

2.1. Insecurity

Quite a number of scholars have discussed insecurity, cattle rustling, and armed banditry. For example, the term “insecurity” was associated with the lack of security, safety, and protection. It indicates being subject to danger, palpable fear, anxiety, intimidation, uncertainty, or harassment in the various aspects of human life ([Ewetan & Urhie, 2014](#); [Obarisiagbon & Akintoye, 2019](#); [Onoja, 2014](#); [Osawe, 2015](#); [Purity & Anigbuogu, 2019](#); [Rosenje & Adeniyi, 2021](#)). [Ozoigbo \(2019\)](#) included oppression, loss of focus, self-confidence, and loss of humanness. According to Merriam-Webster, insecurity is a condition whereby the state does not sufficiently protect its citizens ([Ladan, 2019](#)). Moreover, [Osawe \(2015\)](#) believes that insecurity involves any threat to the overall peace of the citizens, infrastructures, and governmental institutions, ranging from demonstrations, organized crimes, civil disorder, militancy, insurgency, cattle rustling, armed banditry, and domestic terrorism.

2.2. Cattle Rustling

Cattle rustling is also called cattle raiding ([Bunei et al., 2016](#); [Cheserek et al., 2012](#)). However, there are some who differentiate between these two terms. For example, [Cheserek et al. \(2012\)](#) argue that cattle rustling refers to the forceful stealing of livestock by a gang of criminals using sophisticated weapons and leaving behind loss of lives and destruction of properties. But cattle raiding means stealing livestock without killing or destroying peoples’ properties. [Ali et al. \(2019\)](#) distinguish cattle raiding from cattle rustling using indicators such as organization, mode of attack, and the number of livestock stolen. Cattle raiding involves using traditional weapons like bows, arrows, spears, and stones, where the stolen cattle may not be more than fifty. However, cattle rustling involves using sophisticated weapons like AK47, AK49, G3 magazines, etc., and the stolen cattle range from fifty to three hundred and above. According to [Ahmed \(2018\)](#), cattle rustling means application of force to steal livestock. This characterizes the nature and pattern of cattle rustling in Katsina state.

2.3. Armed Banditry

The term “banditry” refers to violent armed robbery in communities where there is either inadequate presence of laws or a breakdown of those laws ([Collins, 2000](#)). Banditry is a violent, illegal activity organized by criminals to rob, attack villages, rustle cattle, and kidnap individuals to accumulate wealth ([Abdullahi, 2019](#)). [Attah et al. \(2021\)](#) define banditry as an act of violent crime deploying local or sophisticated weapons with the motive to steal, rape, injure, kill, and waste community resources. Therefore, armed banditry means the act of invasion, raiding, or attacking communities to loot their goods, rape, injure and kidnap people by an organized armed group of criminals residing in the forest to avert the security officials arrest ([Abdulyakeen, 2021](#)). [Abdulrahman and Akuva \(2020\)](#) stated that armed banditry flourishes in a state where

the government fails its responsibilities as a custodian of lives and properties, especially in remote communities. Armed banditry prevails more in the rural areas of Katsina state.

2.4. Lederach's Model of Peacebuilding

The study is anchored within the submission of [Lederach's \(1997\)](#) Model of Peacebuilding. It is important to note that most actors engaged in the peace process have accepted the Lederach model as a guide to the activities of stakeholders ([Abubakar & Ropers, 2021](#)). [Lederach \(1997\)](#) introduced three levels of actors involved in the peacebuilding process: the top, middle range, and grassroots actors. Each level of actors has assigned responsibilities in the peacebuilding process. This study concentrated on the role of actors at the middle-range level by explicitly focusing on the traditional and religious leaders, who are among the key actors at this level.

According to [Lederach \(1997\)](#), middle-range actors are highly respected individuals who might not necessarily be within the formal structures of government, such as ethnic and religious leaders, academics, intellectuals, humanitarian organizations, and other sectors. Yet, they are crucial in the process of creating and sustaining peace. [Paffenholz \(2014\)](#) observed that middle-level actors possess the highest capability for establishing durable conditions to support the peacebuilding process over a long period. In his hybrid peacebuilding, [Uesugi \(2020\)](#) also emphasizes the role of "mid-space intermediaries" as bridge-builders for sustainable peacebuilding. In addition, [Askandar \(2021\)](#) noted that transforming conflict involves all levels of actors, especially in tracks 2 and 3, which create a strong base and platform for peace to occur.

Similarly, [Lederach \(1997\)](#) argued that middle-range actors connect with the top leadership and grassroots actors through formal and informal relationships. Their approaches to peace include problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and the development of peace commissions. In this respect, the long institutional historical context has offered traditional and religious leaders the privilege of building many relationships (formal and informal) with the top and grassroots level actors in Katsina state. They also have a certain level of flexibility to move and take action within the various traditional and religious domains, as predicated by [Lederach \(1997\)](#). Moreover, their involvement in the problem of insecurity can raise awareness and equip the communities with peace and conflict resolution knowledge from both traditional and religious perspectives. This can assist in transforming the challenges of insecurity in Katsina.

3. Research Methodology

3.1. Study Population

Katsina became a state in September 1987 ([Falola & Genova, 2009](#)). It is located between the Sahel and Savannah regions of Northern Nigeria within a latitude and longitude of "12° 59' 7.9116" N and "7° 37' 1.7184" E, respectively ([Yusuf, 2016](#)). It has an area of 9,341 square miles, which equals 24,971 square kilometers, with a projected population of 10,368,483 as of 2022 ([NPC, 2020](#)). The state shared an international boundary with the Republic of Niger to the North, Kano and Jigawa states to the East, Kaduna state to the South, and Zamfara state to the West. Katsina state has thirty-four (34) local government areas (LGAs), with Katsina city as the state capital. The insecurity

challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state spread across two senatorial districts, namely Katsina Central and Katsina South. The most affected local government areas are Batsari, Dan-Musa, Jibia, and Safana in the Central and the Dan-Dume, Faskari, Kankara, and Sabuwa in the South. Therefore, these eight (8) LGAs were purposively selected for the study.

3.2. Sampling Technique

To determine the sample size of questionnaires required for the study, a small sample technique developed by [Krejcie and Morgan \(1970\)](#) in their work “*Determining Sample Size for Research Activities*” is adopted for its accuracy and suitability to the study. The formula is as follows:

$$S = \frac{X^2 NP (1 - P)}{d^2 (N - 1) + X^2 P (1 - P)}$$

$$S = \frac{3.841 \times 1886300 \times 0.5 (1 - 0.5)}{0.0025 (1886300 - 1) + 3.841 \times 0.5 (1 - 0.5)}$$

$$S = \frac{7245278.3 \times 0.25}{4715.74 + 3.841 \times 0.25}$$

$$S = \frac{1811319.6}{4715.74 + 0.96025}$$

$$S = \frac{1811319.6}{4716.70}$$

$$S = 383.98$$

$$S = 384$$

3.3. Method of Data Collection

This study adopted a mixed methods in order to allow for the use of multiple methods in data collection through a field survey. Therefore, the study used both qualitative and quantitative approaches. As a result, 384 questionnaires were structured based on open and closed-ended questions. Three Likert measurement scales (agree, disagree, and neutral) were used as options for the respondents on closed-ended questions. At the same time, space was provided for the respondents to write their opinions on the open-ended questions. The questionnaires were administered as instruments for data collection across the local government areas purposively selected for the study. It targeted the affected residents within the areas, randomly selected to assess the role of traditional-religious leaders in addressing the insecurity challenges. In the end, 348 questionnaires were successfully recovered for the data analysis (see [Table 1](#)).

Table 1: Required sample size for questionnaires’ administration

State	Senatorial Zone	LGA	Population Size	Pop (%)	Sample Size	Retrieved	Un-Retrieved
Katsina	Katsina Central	Batsari	280,600	15%	58	54	4
		Dan-Musa	152,800	8%	31	30	1
		Jibia	226,000	12%	46	39	7
		Safana	250,000	13%	50	50	0
	Katsina South	Dan-Dume	196,200	10%	38	34	4
		Faskari	262,400	14%	54	47	7
		Kankara	328,400	18%	69	58	11
		Sabuwa	189,900	10%	38	36	2
Total	Two (2)	Eight (8)	1,886,300	100%	384	348	36

Note: LGA= Local Government Area; Pop = Population; and, % = Percentages.

Sources: Researches’ Field work, 2023.

In the qualitative approach, in-depth interviews were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire with at least two (2) stakeholders from each local government area (one traditional and one religious leader). Thus, nine (9) traditional rulers and eleven (11) religious leaders were interviewed to bring the total number of twenty (20) participants. The interviews were conducted face-to-face, except one of the religious leaders from Dan-Dume LGA that was interviewed through a phone call. The discussions were recorded using MF3 and Phone. The mood and nature of the participants' responses determined the length of interview session. The shortest interviewed session was 6:29 minutes, while the longest was 52:56 minutes. The Interviewed Respondents (IR) were coded (IR1-IR20) for the analysis. See the [Table 2](#).

Table 2: Interview Respondents' Local Government Area, Position, Date conducted, and Code

S/N0	Senatorial Zone	Local Gov't Area	Title/Position	Code
1.	Katsina Central	Batsari	Village Head, Kasai.	IR1
2.			Religious Leader.	IR2
3.			Village Head, Darini	IR3
4.			Imam Jumaat Mosque.	IR4
5.		Dan-Musa	Ward Head.	IR5
6.			Chief Imam.	IR6
7.		Jibia	Ward Head.	IR7
8.			Imam, Central Mosque.	IR8
9.			Religious Leader.	IR9
10.		Safana	Village Head, Salihuwa.	IR10
11.	Katsina South	Dan-Dume	Chief Imam, Dan-Nagayya.	IR11
12.			Ward Head, Hayin Abasa.	IR12
13.			Religious Leader.	IR13
14.			Village Head, Kadisau.	IR14
15.		Faskari	Chief Imam (Darika Sec).	IR15
16.			Chief Imam (Izala Sec).	IR16
17.			Ward Head, Sabon Gari.	IR17
18.		Kankara	Chief Imam, Jumaat Mosque.	IR18
19.			Village Head, Marmara.	IR19
20.		Sabuwa	Religious Leaders (Secretary of Darika Sec).	IR20

Source: Research's Field Work, 2023.

3.4. Data Analysis

The study adopted content and descriptive analyses. The qualitative data from the in-depth interviews were transcribed and subjected to content analysis using thematic approach. Regarding the questionnaires, the data from open-ended questions were also content analyzed. The close-ended questions were subjected to the descriptive method through Excel to analyzed the data using tables, graphs, and percentages.

4. Results and Discussion of Findings

4.1. Traditional Rulers and Insecurity Challenges in Katsina State

The Table 3 and Figure 1 present the percentages of the respondents who acknowledged the efforts of traditional rulers in transforming the insecurity challenges in the local government areas and Katsina state.


Table 3: Respondents' percentages on the traditional rulers' efforts by local government area

S/N0	LGA	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Neutral (%)	Total (%)
1.	Batsari	83	11	6	100
2.	Dan-Dume	71	0	29	100
3.	Dan-Musa	54	43	3	100
4.	Faskari	75	21	4	100
5.	Jibia	71	21	8	100
6.	Kankara	76	17	7	100
7.	Sabuwa	92	3	5	100
8.	Safana	88	4	8	100

Source: Researcher's Filed Work, 2023.

Figure 1 established that 77% of the respondents acknowledged the contributions of traditional leaders in transforming the insecurity challenges in Katsina state, while 15% disagreed and 8% were neutral.

Figure 1: Respondents' percentages on the traditional rulers' efforts in Katsina state.
Source: Researcher's Field Work, 2023.



4.1.1. Contributions of Traditional Rulers in Addressing Insecurity Challenges in Katsina State

Traditional leaders contributed to many aspects of addressing the challenges of insecurity in Katsina. Respondents (77%) established that the traditional leaders, from ward heads to village heads and district heads, have tried to promote peaceful cooperation between the Fulani and the Hausa communities. The local leaders have held negotiations, dialogues, and reconciliation with the rustlers/bandits' leaders to resolve the problems peacefully. They also consulted and engaged the Fulani elders, Meyatti-Allah leaders, and the Ardos (Fulani leaders) to persuade and urge the rustlers/bandits to relinquish their weapons for peace. A ward head interviewed said, "We discussed and

begged some of their parents and traditional leaders who live with them to please tell their children, for the sake of God and his messenger, to stop these activities” (IR7). In the Batsari local government, a village head narrated:

“We tried to unite people, including the rustlers/bandits, through their leaders. We organized dialogue meetings with them to discuss how the problems could be addressed to the point that the issues have grown superior to our efforts. Before now, we entered the Fulanis’ villages to enlighten them. At that time, there was a success, and many of them repented. We created associations between Hausas and Fulanis. We engaged in activities like clearing roads and re-demarcating cattle routes as one of their points of contention.” (IR1).

Respondents in Jibia and Faskari local governments (see [Table 3](#)) pointed out that some of the rustlers/bandits still respect some local leaders. The leaders often mediate to settle minor issues between the communities and rustlers/bandits. Sometimes, traditional leaders caution them about their negative acts. A village head explained:

“We tried to establish good relationships between Fulani and Hausa people. I have organized sittings between them to settle many pressing issues. We also tried to ensure that the warring communities did not take laws into their own hands. Because this is what makes some communities retaliate over previous attacks.” (IR19).

Respondents (77%) in Katsina state observed that the traditional leaders embarked on peace advocacy, public orientation, enlightenment, and awareness campaigns. It aims to sensitize people about the dangers of participating in rustling/banditry activities and its consequences on the socio-economic well-being of communities. The local people were encouraged to eradicate illiteracy by enrolling their children in schools while advising youths to be educated and self-dependent. Traditional leaders also collaborated with religious leaders. A ward head interviewed in the Dan-Dume local government stated,

“We organized prayer sessions. Our Imams and we (the traditional rules) have joined hands together to conduct special prayers to God for his intervention to end the rustling/banditry problems in our communities.” (IR12).

Another village head disclosed:

“We established a committee that brings together all the religious leaders, Muslims and non-Muslims. This committee is responsible for preaching and creating awareness in various neighboring communities. We also organized prayers to seek God’s intervention.” (IR19).

The village head of Kasai revealed:

“We bring the religious leaders closer to assist in preaching the word of God to people. We have organized many gatherings to sensitize and educate our people about the importance of living in peace, especially those with weapons under their custody.” (IR1).

Traditional leaders have advised the government to address the problem of insecurity. The village head of Darini concurred that *“we took advantage of our State House of Assembly representative to send messages to the government about our conditions, not only him but any governmental official we knew had been contacted”* (IR3). The village head of Kasai confirmed that *“we informed the authorities of the situation in our communities and the people’s condition since we live together”* (IR1). To no avail, the traditional leaders joined efforts to safeguard their communities by creating local security guards, known as “vigilante groups,” to confront the rustlers/bandits and assist in tackling the insecurity challenges in the communities.

Traditional leaders recruited youths and hunters and supported them with food, motorcycles, fuel, and local weapons to protect the community members’ lives and properties. They patrol day and night and report insecurity threats to the traditional rulers or appropriate authorities. They also identified suspects and handed them over to the security personnel. In the Kankara local government area, 76% of the respondents noted that some traditional leaders participated in security patrol and alerted the security personnel on other rustling/banditry activities within and across the various communities. The Kadisau village head explained:

“We have not offended any of them (rustlers/bandits), but they attacked us. So, we decided to cooperate with our vigilante groups in the Kadisau communities. We do not sleep or relent. This is what assists us in reducing the magnitude of the insecurity problems here and with prayers seeking God’s assistance. After that, we practically defend ourselves.” (IR14).

Another interviewee said, *“We patrol day and night with vigilante groups. Some rich men in the communities contribute financially to support and encourage them”* (IR3). The village head of Marmara further noted that *“we provide information to the security personnel and advise them on how to approach the problems”* (IR19). In their findings, [Ojo et al. \(2023\)](#) discovered the formation of vigilante groups that use locally made weapons to combat insecurity challenges.

In Jibia, Safana, Faskari, and Sabuwa local governments (see [Table 3](#)), respondents observed that the affected communities established security committees to monitor the movement of strangers, visitors, or people who relocated into the communities. Besides, the local leaders have mobilized community members to buy weapons to defend themselves and report suspicious movements to nearby authorities. In their studies, [Bashir, Azlizan and Yusof \(2018\)](#) found that traditional leaders had encouraged collective security efforts and advised people to be conscious of strangers in their communities. A ward head interviewed reiterated:

“Every ward head has a security committee consisting of ten people patrolling together with the vigilante groups. But when things become more complicated, everybody starts coming out to participate. There was a time when it was better to stay outside than to be inside the house due to the intense attacks by the rustlers/bandits.” (IR12).

The village head of Darini commented that *“we use some trusted community members to serve as watchdogs and investigators. Any suspicious person, confirmed to be an informer, will be arrested and handed to the authorities”* (IR3).

The ward head of Sabon Garin Kankara interviewed stated:

"We have created committees in each area. People stay in their area to defend themselves. If the problem is beyond them, they seek assistance from people close to them. Nobody goes anywhere at night, and anywhere one goes, the moment it is 10:00 pm, he must return home and carry his weapon. If an informer is caught, especially with substantial evidence, we hand him over to the authorities." (IR17).

Another Key Informant interviewed in Jibia local government explained:

"Our patrol ended at the town's entrances. Following them to the forest is illegal. To avoid taking the law into our hands, we guard our town, and whoever dares come, we are ready to defend ourselves. A report will be sent to the district head where the defense is weak. He will then call the ward head and direct him to encourage people to defend themselves." (IR7).

Other traditional leaders' efforts observed by the respondents in Batsari, Kankara, and Sabuwa local governments (see [Table 3](#)) include collaboration with the security personnel and cooperated maximally on the Security Containment Orders initiated by the state government. The local leaders also serve as interactive mechanisms between their communities and the government. Regarding funding their activities, the ward head interviewed in Dan-Musa local government argued that *"nothing comes as support except our contributions. We do it precisely to buy items needed for patrol like touch lights, sticks, local guns, and so on"* (IR5). Another village head in the Faskari local government said:

"We seek assistance from farmers, businessmen, and the wealthiest people in the community to buy patrol items. Even women are contributing to this insecurity issue. Our local government chairman is also making an effort regarding the funding issue." (IR14).

4.1.2. Challenges of Traditional Leaders in Transforming Insecurity Problems

Traditional leaders faced several challenges in addressing the insecurity problems in Katsina state. Respondents (83%) in the Batsari local government argued that the participants in the communities' dialogues were not the real leaders of rustlers/bandits. In their studies, [Maigari et al. \(2021\)](#) confirmed multiple camps of the rustlers/bandits, and those involved in dialogue were not the actual field operators. A ward head interviewed in the Jibia local government noted:

"We tried to dialogue with them, but it was not successful. They were not honest and sincere. No matter what you do to them, they will betray you. Those involved are inside the forest. They usually gathered and met before going where they planned to attack." (IR7).

The respondents argued that the vigilante groups created were not trained and equipped with sophisticated weapons. Traditional guns, daggers, and sticks cannot repel the rustlers/bandits' attacks. Moreover, the informants who constantly shared information with rustlers/bandits about the movement of traditional rulers and

vigilante groups have hampered most of their efforts. The village head of Darini interviewed reiterated: *"What makes it difficult is that we live with informers within the communities. Whenever our people went out for patrol or blocked the road, they would call to inform them. Their informers keep updating them till they reach their operation zones"* (IR3). In Dan-Musa, the interviewee said: *"All those giving them information are within the town. If not, how could someone inside the forest know the secrets of what is going on in the town? Unfortunately, many unexpected people are involved"* (IR5). A ward head interviewed revealed, *"It is difficult to identify them except when they are caught. Informants issue is the ugliest and worst problem that needs to be urgently addressed"* (IR12). One of the ward heads further explained:

"I am suspicious about the immigrants who come in from nowhere. They have contributed to the invasion of their villages by supplying information to criminals. I think they are also contributing to the persistence of attacks here. This is one of the reasons the insecurity challenges of rustling/banditry still exist." (IR17).

Respondents in the Batsari, Dan-Musa, Jibia, Faskari, Kankara, and Safana local governments (see [Table 3](#)) noted that some traditional leaders are guilty of associating with the rustlers and bandits. Some collaborated out of fear for their lives, while others have turned insecurity issues into a money-making venture. Some are afraid of being deposed from their positions. As a result, people have lost faith in them and no longer listen to or cooperate with them. In their study, [Bashir et al. \(2018\)](#) revealed that many communities have ceased respecting traditional leaders. Respondents also argued the local leaders had lost their dignity and respect in the face of the rustlers/bandits. Any village head prepared to stay with his community must compromise with rustlers/bandits because of their pressure. One of the village heads interviewed pointed out:

"One thing affecting the efforts in tackling insecurity is the benefits that some of our leaders, the politicians, the village, and ward heads are driven from it. Many were caught collaborating with rustlers/bandits. Some local leaders collect percentages whenever cattle are rustled. Sometimes, they collect money or part of what has been stolen. The most painful thing is that sometimes, it was stolen from their people." (IR1).

A study conducted by [Manyok \(2017\)](#) discovered a strong relationship between rustlers/bandits and the traditional leaders, politicians, and wealthy people in Sudan who sponsored and provided logistics to them. Furthermore, the corrupt nature and injustice of some security personnel, judges, and lawyers complicate the situation. It has impeded the efforts made by some dedicated traditional leaders. Many suspected rustlers/bandits and informants have been apprehended by local leaders and handed over to the security personnel who conspired and set them free. This has discouraged traditional leaders from openly exposing or sharing valuable information with the authorities. One of the interviewees stated:

"The most painful thing is that sometimes you will give information, and the suspects will be arrested and taken to the station, but after some time, they will be released and come back. This kind of thing is affecting and demoralizing our efforts. It means that other sections have not done their work well." (IR19).

Respondents in Dan-Musa and Dan-Dume local governments (see [Table 3](#)) argued that politicians have overpowered the traditional leaders. Rustlers/bandits are more powerful in many affected communities than the local leaders. They have grown stronger beyond their control and capacities to the extent that they cannot do anything in their communities. Some remain silent to live peacefully, while others flee for their safety. A ward head interviewed said, *“The traditional rulers were officially informed that if they found it difficult within their communities, they should leave. However, we are still in the mix of our people”* (IR5). Another interviewee observed:

“We lack unity from the beginning. This allows the politicians to worsen the situation. These Fulani were used as political thugs during campaigns and elections. I can remember that some of our politicians brought weapons for them, like cutlasses and long sticks, before they became familiar with guns. Any difficult polling unit to win during elections would be deployed there to intimidate people or destroy the elections.” (IR1).

According to respondents in the Faskari, Kankara, and Safana local governments (see [Table 3](#)), addressing insecurity problems requires adequate capital. Traditional leaders have no resources to address issues such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and deficient social amenities in the villages. Respondents in Batsari, Dan-Musa, Jibia, Kankara, and Faskari local governments (see [Table 3](#)) further noted that traditional leaders are not part of the state decision-making circle. As a result, they cannot make decisions or act independently regarding state security matters. Traditional leaders had limitations to areas where they could intervene. Kadisau village head said, *“Traditional rulers are not carrying along in the decision-making process. That is what causes all these problems. The government should try to unite us to understand the situation better”* (IR14).

4.2. Religious Leaders and the Challenges of Insecurity in Katsina State

The [Table 4](#) and [Figure 2](#) established the respondents’ percentages about the role of religious leaders in transforming the insecurity challenges across the local government areas and the state, respectively.


Table 4: Respondents’ percentages on the religious leaders’ efforts by local government area

S/N0	LG A	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Neutral (%)	Total (%)
1.	Batsari	87	4	9	100
2.	Dan-Dume	73	9	18	100
3.	Dan-Musa	80	17	3	100
4.	Faskari	89	2	9	100
5.	Jibia	74	8	18	100
6.	Kankara	83	10	7	100
7.	Sabuwa	92	5	3	100
8.	Safana	94	4	2	100

Source: Researcher’s Field Work, 2023.

[Figure 2](#) shows that 85% of the respondents recognized the role of religious leaders in resolving the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state. While 7% disagreed and 8% were neutral.

Figure 2: Respondents' percentages on the religious leaders' efforts in Katsina state.
Source: Researcher's Field Work, 2023.



4.2.1 Efforts of Religious Leaders in Addressing Insecurity Challenges in Katsina State

Religious leaders have made efforts to address the problems of insecurity. Respondents (85%) in Katsina stated the first effort of spiritual leaders is constant prayers for peace, encouraging people to intensify prayers and seek God's assistance. They used the daily and weekly congregational prayers to convey peace messages and impart fear of God to the followers. The religious leaders organized weekly and monthly Qur'an recitations to seek God's intervention and mandated people to do so. In the Batsari local government, respondents (87%) noted that some spiritual leaders required people to recite a specific verse in the Qur'an (Ayatul-Kursy) one thousand times and solicit God's mercy to alleviate the problems of insecurity in Katsina state.

A religious leader interviewed said, *"Our key effort is prayer. That is what the prophet teaches us. Whenever there are calamities, we should pray to God. Then God will take it away"* (IR13). In Jibia local government area, one of the religious leaders revealed that *"prayers were organized throughout the state, which, up to today, we still do here. In every five (5) daily prayers, we pray for peace"* (IR9). [Ladan and Usman \(2020\)](#) discovered similar findings in Katsina state, where the government organized prayer sessions and the Qur'anic recitation to seek God's intervention in the insecurity issues. Another interviewee maintained:

"Many Qur'anic verses and Prophetic Hadiths confirm that prayer can cure any tragedy. Therefore, prayer is the first contribution of students and Islamic scholars to the problem of insecurity. In many days to come, we stand on our position that if these insecurity problems are to be eradicated, we must be dedicated to prayers and organizing recitation of the Qur'an." (IR6).

A religious leader interviewed in the Batsari local government area explained that:

"Some perpetrators attend wedding and naming ceremonies. We use those opportunities during prayers to include the insecurity issues in prayers for God's intervention and for lightly indicating that it's a bad thing and prohibited by Islam. We also include them in prayers for God to guide them to stop. I use the opportunity to deliver peace messages since they are coming to pray there." (IR2).

The respondents (85%) maintained that religious leaders have preached for peace and condemned the actions of rustlers/bandits as against the teachings and practices of Islam. They engaged in moral reorientations, educating people on what God said in the Holy Qur'an about the issues and made clear the punishment for those who steal, rape, kidnap and kill in the hereafter. They called upon the rustlers/bandits to fear God and abandon their activities. The religious leaders explained that it is illegal and prohibited in Islam to destabilize the peace and stability of people through criminal activities. A spiritual leader interviewed in the Faskari local government area upheld:

"We preach to our people that God has said the tragedy is sleeping, and he has cursed whosoever wakes it up and removed all his blessings upon him. We also enlightened them about the consequences of being involved in rustling and banditry activities and told them to fear God." (IR15).

The Chief Imam interviewed in the Safana local government disclosed, *"We stand up in every gathering to quote the Qur'an and Prophetic Hadiths describing the nature of punishment for killing people in the hereafter, not only to the rustlers/bandits but even to their parents, who refused to train them well as they grew up"* (IR11). Another religious leader said, *"we are educating, preaching and calling the attention of people about the consequences surrounding the insecurity issues here and the hereafter"* (IR2). The Chief Imam of Dan-Musa responded that *"we use the podium of Jummaat prayer to preach and sensitize people about the repercussions of killing someone innocently. God has declared it as one of the major crimes on the earth"* (IR6). Similar research conducted by [Abubakar and Ibrahim \(2020\)](#) indicated that religious leaders intensified preaching in mosques, churches, and schools about the negative consequences of armed banditry. The Imam of Batsari Jumaat mosque interviewed said:

"We preach and sensitize the people to discourage them from such activities and restore peace to our communities. We tell them that even if nothing has been done here, there is a judgment day hereafter. All Muslims believe that there is another life after this one where God will do justice to everyone." (IR4).

Respondents in the Faskari, Jibia, Safana, and Sabuwa local governments (see [Table 4](#)) observed that some spiritual leaders volunteered to be involved in the night patrol operations and other security monitoring efforts to defend their communities. They mobilized people to protect their families against the rustlers/bandits' attacks. They urged them to be vigilant of individuals who relocated to their areas to enhance the community security efforts. The religious leaders also encouraged people to report relevant information on security threats to their traditional leaders or nearest security offices. A spiritual leader interviewed in the Jibia local government said:

"We educate people on the need to come out to defend themselves. We encourage them to protect themselves through sleepless nights. Whoever went out to defend himself and his family or community and lost his life will be called "Mujahid" (someone who has a guarantee to enter paradise) by God's grace." (IR9).

In the Faskari, Kankara, Safana, and Jibia local governments (see [Table 4](#)), respondents observed that the religious leaders advised the government to take action through the Fulani leaders (Ardos) and dialogue with the rustlers/bandits' leaders. Their genuine

demands should be fulfilled to resolve the challenges of insecurity peacefully. In their study, [Kolade and Mohammed \(2022\)](#) revealed that a renowned Muslim cleric, Sheikh Ahmad Abubakar Gumi, advised the government to dialogue with the rustlers and bandits. The spiritual leaders have also tried to initiate an avenue for reconciliation between communities and rustlers/bandits. A religious leader narrated:

"We tried to liaise with those who have direct relationships with the rustlers and bandits to encourage them to stop attacking the Jibia town as they have their blood relatives and friends here. They promised to stop, and whenever anything happened, they would categorically mention the criminals or deal with the person if he was among them. However, many leadership crises, even among them, destroyed the arrangement." (IR9).

In the Safana local government, the Chief Imam of Dan-Nagayya discloses that:

"Whenever there is any community peace discussion, we, the religious leaders, lead it every time. We have done it once in the house of one "Ardo" (Fulani leader). At that time, in that place, it was "Ardo" who led the discussion, and he was very neutral. That was why we agreed with him to lead the discussion." (IR11).

Respondents in the Safana and Dan-Musa (see [Table 4](#)) noted that some religious leaders had participated in the previous dialogues between the government and the rustlers/bandits and urged involving other stakeholders in the peace process. The Imam interviewed in the Kankara local government concurred, *"Whenever the government attempts to dialogue with the rustlers and bandits, some religious leaders are invited to pray and preach to make them understand that what they are doing is against Islam"* (IR18).

In the funding-related issues, a religious leader interviewed revealed, *"Nobody is taking our responsibility regarding the preaching and enlightenment activities. We do it for the sake of God"* (IR15). The Imam in the Faskari local government also said, *"We are doing it for God's sake. We are not getting any support from the government, groups, or organizations"* (IR16). In other words, *"there is no intervention by any group or agency, be it a vehicle, repairing and fuelling it, or taking up our responsibilities to enter villages for the activities"* (IR2). Another participant stated:

"We fuel our bikes to go out. We posted some of our Imams to different mosques and places in neighbouring communities to preach and educate people on insecurity problems. We do all these for God's sake and to get relief from the dangerous activities of the rustlers/bandits. That is, it." (IR18).

In the Dan-Dume local government, one of the Imams reiterated that:

"The prophet (SAW) said the better ones among you are those that benefited people. So, we are not getting anything from anywhere. We contribute money every week and keep it. Whenever we cultivate our farms, we contribute to keeping the activities running. Those who are doing business among us also contribute." (IR13).

On the contrary, the Imam in the Dan-Musa local government said, *"The government is contributing to some extent"* (IR6).

Another religious leader interviewed in the Batsari local government responded:

"Sometimes, the government gathered religious leaders, Imams, and those who can memorize the Qur'an for special prayer. The government gave them some allowances to continue praying to God for sustainable peace in our communities. I think this is the contribution, except that certain individuals from the community and those who expose themselves, like civil society groups, also assist." (IR4).

The respondents (85%) observed that religious leaders have tried to transform and reorient people's attitudes. They urged the community members to stand and impart good moral values to their children instead of migrating. Religious leaders exploit media platforms such as radio, television, social media, etc., to guide people on the right path. They encouraged youths to attend schools and acquire Islamic and Western knowledge so that their communities would be proud of them. [Sanchi et al. \(2021\)](#) emphasized the importance of religious leaders' advice and sensitization against rustling/banditry. A spiritual leader interviewed disclosed:

"Many people who look suspicious in the community do come to us to ask some questions, like if someone stole people's property that led to the loss of lives. After he realizes those mistakes and seeks forgiveness from God, will God forgive him without going to the victims to seek their forgiveness? This shows that our preaching and sensitizations benefit them, so they seek further information to correct their mistakes. Many have returned and restored relationships with their brothers, neighbours, friends, etc. So, there is nothing bigger one can do to the people, like transforming their attitudes and behaviours." (IR13).

The Chief Imam (Izala sect) interviewed in the Faskari local government also stated:

"One of the actions taken was that in any place where immoral activities are more pronounced, we try to ensure that such activities have been banned. This is to checkmate the attitudes and behaviors of our youths in the community because immorality is one of the vices contributing to what is happening today." (IR16).

In another interview, a religious leader noted, *"We preach to change the people's mindsets and relationships, especially with the perpetrators"* (IR18). *"Through our efforts, many rustlers and bandits have sincerely repented, as confirmed by the community members"* (IR4). *"We also preach to the remorseful rustlers/bandits to conduct themselves according to the teaching of Islam and distance from committing sins against God and destruction of others"* (IR8).

Similarly, a religious leader interviewed in the Safana local government maintained:

"We enlighten parents to study carefully the relationships and friendships of their children. They should observe the nature of their friends and interrelationships. If they went out, what were they doing, where did they

go, and to whom or what made them return home late at night? All these things should be checked out. Moreover, whenever they are coming for reorientation, they should come along with their children.” (IR11).

In the Dan-Musa local government, the Chief Imam narrated that:

“Assuming the perpetrators have good attitudes and mindsets, they would not have engaged in rustling/banditry. So, we join different preaching platforms to change people’s attitudes and reorient them. We also use the month of Ramadan because of the daily translation of the Quran, transmitted through various means, to call people’s attention to the importance of good conduct. This can further assist in achieving peace.” (IR6).

The Secretary of the Darika Awareness Forum in the Sabuwa local government said:

“We travelled to neighbouring communities and villages to educate people about the importance of unity, togetherness, establishing a good relationship and living peacefully with one another and many other aspects of peoples’ lives through preaching.” (IR20).

Another religious leader who participated in the interview explained:

“We call people’s attention to stop envy, jealousy, and the packaging of bad things in their hearts, and to stop under-rating someone as poor. These things cause injustice and wickedness among people, making one an informant to facilitate the kidnapping of others or stealing their property. We frequently organized gatherings to sensitize people on the consequences of these habits.” (IR13).

4.2.2. Challenges of Religious Leaders in Transforming Insecurity Problems in Katsina State

Religious leaders have encountered numerous challenges. Respondents (85%) in Katsina state argued that preaching and prayers alone could not resolve the insecurity problems because God answered prayers at his will. Likewise, most rustlers/bandits are based in the forest, so they do not attend mosques for prayers or other public gatherings where the spiritual leaders preach. Religious leaders also could not risk their lives to enter the forest and preach due to fear of being kidnapped or killed. Besides, most rustlers/bandits are illiterates (both Islamic and Western education) and often work under drug influence, which can alter their attitudes within a very short time to commit crimes. A religious leader interviewed in the Kankara local government stated, *“We do not have the opportunity to enter some places, as many villages were inaccessible” (IR18).* *“We cannot go to their places to preach for our safety, and they cannot come to town” (IR2).* Another participant from the Dan-Dume local government narrates his experience:

“There was a time we were peaching and sensitizing people in a village around Giwa. Over 200 rustlers/bandits with their guns entered the town. They blocked the mosque entrances. Some came in, smoking marijuana and pouring the smoke on our faces. So, we keep quiet, thinking of what to do. I then stood up and said, there is no one with two souls, and all of us

will die one day. I talked harshly, using words that speak directly to the hearts. I said we should fear God and know that injustice cannot be sustained for eternity. If sustained, it will dominate those who are committing it. From there, they start going out. Ultimately, they start contributing money, asking us to pray for them. So, you see the danger we faced.” (IR13).

Respondents (85%) further noted that some religious leaders kept mute to avoid being at loggerheads with rustlers/bandits and the government. Other corrupt and unfaithful ones got involved, which made them incapable of speaking the truth. A religious leader interviewed in the Safana local government stated:

“I remember, some years back in Ummadau village where someone who had been disguising as a religious leader was found guilty among the criminals during an encounter with the police and lost his life. Most of those associated with crimes are not good Imams. They cannot even teach Islamic knowledge but work for the criminals in one way or the other.” (IR11).

Respondents from the Batsari, Dan-Musa, Jibia, Safana, Faskari, Kankara, and Sabuwa local governments (see [Table 4](#)) argued that the religious leaders have no resources, power, and authority to impose their decisions on state security matters. The government has dominated and failed to engage religious leaders or create an enabling environment where they can fully participate in the peace process. One of the religious leaders interviewed concurred, *“We have no power and authority. It is the government that has such power”* (IR18). The respondents believe the demands of the rustlers/bandits, such as job opportunities, education, roads, and health facilities, are beyond the reach of the religious leaders, and transforming criminals’ behaviors is not a one-day exercise.

Other challenges include *“lack of funds”* (IR16). *“Taking self-responsibility for transportation, feeding, and accommodation to attend a program alone is challenging”* (IR20). Another religious leader interviewed mentioned *“the widespread betrayers “informants” living with community members as a major challenge”* (IR6). A spiritual leader interviewed reiterated:

“Sometimes, the people you work with can also work for the criminals. So, there is a lack of trust among the people. You invite people and work with them, but their children are part and parcel of the perpetrators. They come to participate in our planned activities and return to inform them.” (IR11).

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This study established that traditional and religious leaders had tried to address the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Katsina state. They attempted to dialogue with rustlers/bandits through inter-communal peace meetings. They also engaged in prayers, preachings, Qur’an recitations for peace, public awareness, enlightenment campaigns, moral reorientation, and attitude transformation. The traditional and spiritual leaders have supported security personnel with information and advised the government to address the insecurity problems peacefully.

They tried to defend their communities by creating vigilante groups and encouraging people to protect themselves. However, the efforts proved insufficient due to insincerity and difficulties in reconciling with the rustlers and bandits, illiteracy, drug abuse, rampant activities of informants, poverty, unemployment, and inadequate training and weapons by the vigilante members. Besides, some religious and traditional leaders collaborated with the rustlers/bandits to derive benefits or for fear of their lives. There was also fear of being deposed by the government. Traditional and religious leaders lack the resources and power to make security decisions independently, among others. These confirmed that the insecurity challenges of cattle rustling and armed banditry are beyond the traditional and religious leaders' capabilities. Their efforts alone could not resolve the problems in Katsina state.

Therefore, the study recommends that resolving insecurity challenges in Katsina state must be the collective responsibility of all stakeholders. The government, security personnel, traditional and religious leaders, affected communities, and civil society groups must work together as a team for the peaceful resolution of the cattle rustling and armed banditry challenges in the state. Negotiation, dialogue, and reconciliation should be prioritized. The state government must adopt an inclusive approach, allowing all stakeholders to participate and contribute to a transparent, successful, and sustainable peace process. Traditional and religious leaders should sustain sensitization efforts, public enlightenment campaigns, reorientation, and the transformation of attitudes in the affected communities through constant preachings. Traditional rulers must be honest and sincere in their dealings or relationships with the rustlers/bandits, the government, and the communities. To achieve a permanent and sustainable peace, the state and local governments must alleviate poverty, create job opportunities, eradicate illiteracy, and provide basic social amenities to the rural communities in Katsina state.

Ethics Approval and Consent of Participation

The researchers used the research ethics provided by the Directorate of Research & Development of Federal University Lokoja (FUL). All procedures performed in this study involving human participants were conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the directorate. Informed consent was obtained from all participants according to the Directorate guidelines.

Acknowledgement

Part of this article was extracted from a doctoral thesis submitted to University Sains Malaysia, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia.

Funding

No funding.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declarer no conflict of interests.

References

- Abdullahi, A. (2019). Rural Banditry, Regional Security and Integration in West Africa. *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, 2(3), 644–654. <https://doi.org/10.31014/aior.1991.02.03.107>
- Abdulrahman, A., & Akuva, I. I. (2020). Thomas Hobbes Social Contract Theory and the Menace of Banditry in Katsina State. *FUDMA Journal of Politics and International Affairs*, 3(1), 189–198.
- Abdulyakeen, A. (2021). Armed Banditry and Human Security in Northwestern Nigeria: The Impacts and the Way Forward. *Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences*, 1(1), 89–107. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3881652>
- Abubakar, A. U., & Ropers, N. (2021). Chapter 4: Transforming Conflict. In K. Askandar (Ed.), *Peace and Conflict Transformation in Southeast Asia* (pp. 98–133). Bangkok. ASEAN University Network (AUN) (HRE), SHAPESEA, and SEACSN.
- Abubakar, L. U., & Ibrahim, M. S. (2020). Al-Ghazzali's Theory of Virtue: an Agent for Addressing Rural Banditry and Conflict in North-West Nigeria. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 18(8), 107–119. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.32660.94088>
- Adi, I., & Onyebuchi, J. U. (2020). Banditry in Nigeria's North-west: a Reflective Perspective. *Caleb Journal of Social and Management Science*, 5(2), 208–224. <https://doi.org/10.26772/cjsms2020050206>
- Ahmed, M. R. (2018). Cattle Rustling and Armed Banditry along Nigeria-Niger Borderlands. *IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 23(4), 66–73. <https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2304046673>
- Aidelokhai, D. I. (2022). Traditional rulers in modern governance in Nigeria: An analytical discourse. *Lapai International Journal of Administration*, 4(2), 63–79.
- Ali, S. B., Kuden Plang I. S., & Isaac, J. (2019). The State, Policies and Cattle Rustling. *Scientific Research Journal (SCIRJ)*, Volume VII, Issue III, VII(III), 85–99. <http://dx.doi.org/10.31364/SCIRJ/v7.i3.2019.P0319627>
- Askandar, K. (2021). Chapter 1: Introduction to Peace and Conflict Transformation. In K. Askandar (Ed.), *Peace and Conflict Transformation in Southeast Asia* (pp. 2–35). Bangkok. ASEA University Network (AUN) (HRE), SHAPESEA, and SEACSN.
- Attah, N. E., Sambo, U., Sule, B., Bello, M. A., & Yoserizal, M. S. (2021). COVID-19 and Increased Security Challenges in Northern Nigeria: Interrogating Armed Banditry in Northwestern Nigeria. *Siasat*, 6(1), 33–44. <https://doi.org/10.33258/siasat.v6i1.87>
- Bashir, A. M., Azlizan, T., & Yusof, R. B. (2018). Cattle Rustling in Kaduna State, Nigeria: An Assessment of the existing Preventive Approaches. *International Journal of Management Research & Review*, 8(9), 20–29.
- Bunei, E., McElwee, G., Smith, R. (2016). From Bush to Butchery: Cattle Rustling as an Entrepreneurial Process in Kenya. *Society and Business Review*, 11(1), 46–61. <https://doi.org/10.1108/SBR-10-2015-0057>
- Cheserek, G. J., Omondi, P. and Odenyo, V. A. O. (2012). Nature and Causes of Cattle Rustling Among Some Pastoral Communities in Kenya. *Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS)*, 3(2), 173–179.
- Collins, H. (2000). *Social Banditry*, (3rd Edition ed.). Harper Collins Publishers. <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/banditry.pdf>.
- Ewetan, O. O., & Urhie, E. (2014). Insecurity and socio-economic development in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development Studies*, 5(1).
- Falola, T., & Genova, A. (2009). *Historical Dictionary of Nigeria*. USA: The Scarecrow Press.
- Hallouch, N. (2018). British Indirect Rule and Islam in Northern Nigeria (1900-1940).

- International Journal of Social Sciences*, 4(2), 249–267. <https://doi.org/10.20319/pijss.2018.42.249267>
- Kolade, G. O., & Mohammed, N. I. (2022). Interrogating Government's Multi-Level Approaches to Ending Armed Banditry in the North-West Region of Nigeria. *Journal of Democratic Studies*, 3(1), 172–195. <http://localhost:8080/xmlvi/handle/123456789/1545>
- Krejcie, R. V., & Morgan, D. W. (1970). Determining sample size for research activities. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 30(3), 607–610. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001316447003000308>
- Ladan, S. I., & Usman, B. M. (2020). Impacts of Banditry on Food Security in Katsina State, Nigeria. *Direct Research Journal of Agriculture and Food Science*, 8(12), 439–449. <https://doi.org/10.26765/DRJAFS278190136>
- Ladan, S. I. (2019). Analysis of contemporary insecurity in Katsina State, Nigeria. *Direct Research Journal of Social Science and Educational Studies*, 6(7), 95–102. <https://doi.org/10.5283/zenodo.3382915>
- Ladan, S. I. (2015). Assessing Security Threats Posed by Ruma/kukar Jangarai Forest Reserve to Batsari Lga Katsina State, Nigeria. *International Journal of Sciences*, 1(06), 62–71. <https://doi.org/10.18483/ijsci.740>
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Maigari, M. A., Dantani, U., & Arafat, I. (2021). Negotiating with the Bandits and Endless Security Challenges in Katsina State, Nigeria (2019-2020). *JSW (Jurnal Sosiologi Walisongo)*, 5(1), 47–60. <https://doi.org/10.21580/jsw.2021.5.1.7232>
- Manyok, P. T. (2017). *Cattle rustling and its effects among three communities (Dinka, Murle, and Nuer) in Jonglei State, South Sudan*. Nova Southeastern University.
- Munir, A., & Odeh, G. O. (2014). (6) The Establishment of the Nigerian Sokoto Caliphate: An inquest into the Background History of the 1804 Jihad in Hausa Land, 210 Years After. *Al Qalam*, 19(2), 61–71.
- Nmah, P. E., & Amanambu, U. E. (2017). 1804 Usman Dan Fodio's jihad on inter-group relations in the contemporary Nigerian state. *Journal of Religion and Human Relations*, 9(1), 47–71.
- NPC. (2020). *Nigeria Population Projections and Demographic Indicators: National and States*. National Population Commission, Abuja, Nigeria. <http://factcheckhub.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/national-population-commission-project-2022.pdf>.
- Obarisiagbon, E. I., & Akintoye, E. O. (2019). Insecurity crisis in Nigeria: The law enforcement agents a panacea. *Journal of Sociology & Social Work*, 7(1), 44–51. <https://doi.org/10.15640/jssw.v7nla6>
- Ojo, J. S., Oyewole, S., & Aina, F. (2023). Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity in North-west Nigeria. *Democracy and Security*, 19(4), 319–346. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2023.2164924>
- Olaniyan, A., & Yahaya, A. (2016). Cows, bandits, and violent conflicts: Understanding cattle rustling in Northern Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 51(3), 93–105. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000203971605100305>
- Olawoyin, M. A. (2023). Traditional Administrative System and Community Development in Nigeria: Roles and Relevance of Traditional Institution in Local Community Development. *Organization and Human Capital Development*, 2(1), 41–52. <https://doi.org/10.31098/orcadev.v2i1.1182>
- Oluyemi-Kusa, D. & Salihu, A. (2016). The effect of Armed Banditry on Rural Women's Livelihood and Security: Case Study of Kaduna and Plateau States, Nigeria. In J. Mohammed, J. K. & Ibrahim (Ed.), *Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria*.

- Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD).
- Onoja, A. F. (2014). In search of the causes of Insecurity in Nigeria: A Note on Administrations and their Agendas. *Journal of Conflictology*, 5(1), 33-42. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v5i1.1660>
- Osawe, C. O. (2015). Increase wave of violent crime and insecurity: A threat to socio-economic development in Nigeria. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 20(1), 123-133. <https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-201123133>
- Ozoigbo, B. I. (2019). Insecurity in Nigeria: genesis, consequences and panacea. *European Journal of Social Sciences Studies*, 4(4), 270-281. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3531844>
- Paffenholz, T. (2014). International peacebuilding goes local: analyzing Lederach's conflict transformation theory and its ambivalent encounter with 20 years of practice. *Peacebuilding*, 2(1), 11-27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21647239.2013.783257>
- Purity, N.-O. U., & Anigbuogu, T. (2019). Insecurity in Nigeria: the Implications for Industrialization and Sustainable Development. *International Journal of Research in Business Studies and Management*, 6(5), 7-16. <https://oa.mg/work/3086960824>
- Rosenje, M. O., & Adeniyi, O. P. (2021). The Impact of Banditry on Nigeria's Security in the Fourth Republic: an Evaluation of Nigeria's North-west. *Zamfara Journal of Politics and Development*, 2(1), 1-26.
- Sambo, U., & Sule, B. (2021). COVID-19 and national security challenges in Africa: Analysing the responses towards countering armed banditry in northwestern Nigeria. *Journal of Conflict Resolution and Social Issues*, 1(2), 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.25159/3005-4222/19041>
- Sanchi, I.D., Alhassan, Y., & Vintenaba, S. S., & Dorh, L. (2021). Farmers/Herders Conflict, Cattle Rustling and Banditry: A Threat to Agricultural Productivity in North Western Nigeria: A Review. *Journal of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development*, 9(1), 32-39.
- Uesugi, Y. (2020). *Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia*. Springer.
- Usman, S. I., & Ahmed, I. J. (2021). Efforts of Insecurity on Agricultural Activities in Katsina State, Nigeria. *ABU Journal of Public Administration*, 9(1), 33-55.
- Yahaya, J. U., & Bello, M. M. (2020). Kidnapping and Hostage-taking : an emerging Issue of Insecurity in Kastina State. *Journal of Advances in Social Sciences and Humanities*, 6(3), 1154-1162. <https://doi.org/10.15520/jassh.v6i3.481>
- Yusuf, L. M. (2016). The Spread and Development of Islamic Civilisation in Northern Nigeria: Case Study of Katsina State. *International Journal of Business, Economics, and Law*, 9(5), 173-179.